THE TEACHING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Myres S. McDougal
Let me say in the beginning that I do not take it as my responsibility
in this program to describe the teaching of international law in the
United States. I would not dare to give my version with my colleague,
Professor Stevens, an ex-colleague, Professor McWhinney, and other
friends and associates present in the audience. I do not think, either, that
I will attempt to make any comparison between what is done in the
United States and what is done in England. I had my first training in
England, with Professor Brierly, whom I still regard as one of the great
men of all time.
I am reminded by Professor McWhinney's emphasis upon languages
of an incident that occurred when I was traveling one Christmas to the
Association of American Law Schools meeting with friends, including
a professor from a great school near New Haven. I asked this friend
what he was teaching, and he replied that he was teaching a course in
comparative constitutional law to students from other countries. I happened to know that this man did not know any languages, and so I said,
"How in the world do you teach a course in comparative constitutional
law?" "Well," he said, "it's like this. I teach them the United States
Constitution, and they can damn well compare their own!"
The most that I propose to attempt, without making any pretense of
being representative, is to suggest the broad outlines of an emphasis in
theory about international law which is shared by several of us participating in this meeting and by a considerable number of people back
home. The American Society of International Law has already put out
little pamphlets which describe the teaching of international law, both
in the law schools and in departments of government. Unhappily, a
quick look at these pamphlets demonstrates that much of our teaching,
although it has increased in quantity in the last fifty years, is highly
conventional, emphasizing relatively unimportant problems.
The inspiration that moves many of us in seeking a new and more
comprehensive conceptual map is the same inspiration that was behind
the call for our conference here today. As Professor McWhinney suggests, we attempt to build not only upon sociological jurisprudence, with
its roots deep in England and the continent and elsewhere, but also
upon American legal realism and the theories and findings of the emer[1111
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ging policy sciences. Our emphasis goes beyond most sociological jurisprudence in its insistence upon a conscious, explicit, and deliberate focus
on policy. In our conception, though not all policy is law, all law is
policy-if reference is made to its impacts upon the shaping and sharing
of community values. Our aspiration is to achieve a framework of inquiry which will assist both in the detailed specification of the important
transnational problems of our time and in bringing to bear upon these
problems all the intellectual skills necessary to the creation of a more
appropriate and effective international law.
This is the principal point where I would disagree with Dr. Brownlie.
Policy is not relevant merely for the purpose of finding out what are the
motivations of these mammoth nation-states. Policy is relevant because
it is something we want, something the people in a community demand
to have put into effect among them.
In the terms that Professor Falk employed this morning, the peoples
of the world are demanding protection from threats of nuclear and other
war, the depletion and despoliation of resources, the burdens of overpopulation, epidemics, poverty, deprivations of freedom and human
rights, and so on. Policy is relevant because human beings demand it,
not simply because inquiry about it can be made to shed some light on
the motivations of effective elites.
It is of course as impossible for Dr. Brownlie as for others to escape
considerations of policy. The concepts of aggression and self-defense,
with which he works in his great book on InternationalLaw and the Use
of Force by States, embody the larger community's most important
policy of all, that of the maintenance of a minimum order in which
unauthorized coercion is controlled. It can only be a happy accident that
Dr. Brownlie, without benefit of a policy orientation, came to much the
same conclusions as Dr. Feliciano and myself in our book on Law and
Minimum World Public Order! An explicit and systematic appraisal of
relevant factors in context would still appear to offer a better guarantee
of rationality in decision than either undisciplined hunch or subservience
to ambiguous and tautologous technical concepts.
The law of the sea problems, to which Dr. Brownlie also refers, are
equally infused with inescapable policy choices. In a recent speech Ambassador Pardo, for example, insists that all the distinctions between
"territorial sea," "continental shelf," "continguous zones," "extraterritorial exercises of jurisdiction," and so on-achieved so carefully
through the centuries for balancing the inclusive and exclusive interests
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of states in the enjoyment of a great sharable resource-are useless
because they hamper the coastal state in unilaterally protecting its alleged special interests. It is this kind of theory that is employed to
support the Latin-American states in their demands for a single, comprehensive "territorial sea," or its equivalent in "sovereign jurisdiction," of 200 nautical miles. The only effective answer to these demands
must be in demonstration of their destructiveness of common interests,
including their own genuine exclusive interests, and, hence, of important
general community policy.
The Canadian claim to assert competence with respect to ultrahazardous pollution in a specified zone might, in contrast, be found by
appropriate contextual analyses and distinction of different interests to
be in accord with the policies which underlie historic assertions of contiguous zones and other extraterritorial competences. Relation to common interest depends upon the degree of danger and the proportionality
of the competence asserted.
The basic problem to which we address ourselves this evening is,
however, whether or not there is any way to make this emphasis upon
policy, this policy-oriented approach, more effective in inquiry and decision. My first suggestion is that we need something more than merely
interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary work. I once had a colleague,
Professor Underhill Moore, who insisted that the best collaboration
between the social sciences was in one head. By analogy we need to have
our own jurisprudence of international law, our own comprehensive map
of the realities and intellectual tasks with which we are concerned, to
guide any necessary interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary work. The
historic role of the lawyer or legal scholar is that of the synthesizer, and
we need our own appropriate theory.
If we are to achieve a more effective policy-oriented approach to
international law, certain particular, explicit emphases would appear
indispensable. Some of us are attempting to develop these emphases in
teaching materials, monographs, and articles on various problems. It is
perhaps worth insisting that more than teaching is involved-that inquiry comes first. One cannot be a good teacher without the requisite
knowledge or intellectual procedures for securing such knowledge and
keeping it up to date. The comprehensive theory we seek is thus primarily a theory for inquiry-though hopefully, it may assist in both teaching
and decision.
The major emphases we recommend are five. The first is the establish-

GA. J. INT'L & COMP.

L.

[Vol. 2, Supp. 2: 91

ing of observational standpoint: being clear about who you are and what
you are trying to do, and the comprehensiveness of your map of reality.
The second requires a selectiveness of the focus: What is it that is peculiarly legal among the events with which we are concerned? What is it
that we as lawyers can contribute? The third emphasis is that we make
explicit the intellectual tasks we are trying to perform. The emphasis this
evening has been on reporting the past. Reporting the past is, however,
but the simplest of the tasks required of us. We recommend specifying
a number of interrelated intellectual tasks. If, further, policy is to be a
center of inquiry, then what policies? We suggest, as a fourth emphasis,
that everyone should make his own policies as explicit as possible, that
he deliberately postulate the goal values for which he takes responsibility
as comprehensively and explicitly as possible. We do not care how logically he derives such values. He can derive them from ideologies, religion, metaphysics, or whatever, if he travels down the ladder of abstraction toward relations between human beings that are compatible with a
public order of human dignity. The fifth and final emphasis is upon the
organization of continuous, systematic inquiry. How does one establish
a comprehensive program which will promote the overriding objectives
of inquiry and decision?
For more detailed exposition, we begin with the observational standpoint and the comprehensiveness of the map. This is a point that was
not clarified in our earlier discussion today. I think it is indispensable
that, for purposes of inquiry, the scholar distinguish himself from the
operator-the decision-maker, whether authoritative or merely effective
elite. What the scholar is trying to do is, among other things, to describe
what the decision-maker is doing and to account for his decisions in
terms of the variables that affect them. The technical words that the
decision-maker employs, the conventional rules of law which have been
so omnipresent in our discussions here today, are part of the data being
described and accounted for; if the scholar allows himself to get lost in
the complementarities, ambiguities, and incomplete references of these
technical terms, he will achieve little enlightenment about either the
course of past decision or the factors affecting such course. He will go
around and around, as do the people who talk only about sovereignty,
domestic jurisdiction, international concerns, aggression, self-defense,
freedom of the seas, contiguous zones, and so on without relating these
concepts to the larger context in which these terms are used to justify
particular shapings and sharings of values.
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The scholar cannot of course wholly isolate himself from the community processes of which he is a part. The studies that he makes have
an unavoidable impact upon such processes. What we recommend is that
the scholar be as conscious as possible of the different communities with
which he identifies and that his appropriate indentifications include, at
the most comprehensive level, the whole of mankind. The knowledge the
scholar should seek is that relevant to clarifying and implementing the
common interests of the members of the different communities with
which he identifies, and his special role may be that of demonstrating
to such members common interests which they themselves have not been
able to perceive.
I have an associate who insists that we cannot properly talk of common interests because the Soviet Union and the United States do not
have the same demands, do not see their interests in the same way. This
is a myopia which illustrates the urgent need of the observational standpoint we recommend. From the point of view of the scholar, the observer, one can see that the Soviet Union, the United States, Communist
China, and all the others are scorpions in the same bottle, that they do
have interdependencies and interdeterminations, whether they know it or
not, not only with respect to security, but with respect to wealth, health,
enlightenment, and many other values.
From the standpoint of the observer, of the scholar who is able to
achieve a larger map, we do have, many suggest, a global community
in this sense of interaction and interdetermination, which is sustained by
many explicit and tacit agreements in the disposition of power about the
world. In more detail, one can observe a process of effective power that
embraces the whole globe and extends even into outer space. Decisions
are being taken and enforced, whether the English and Americans like
it or not, whether the Russians like it or not, and whether the Communist Chinese like it or not. These are effective decisions that have consequential impact on a global scale. Many of these decisions are of course
taken largely from perspectives of naked power or expediency. If, however, one looks at these effective decisions closely, it can be seen that
some are taken from perspectives of authority. I mean by this, as suggested earlier today, that these decisions are made by the people who are
expected to make them; that they are made in established structures
(courts, arbitration tribunals, diplomatic interactions, conferences, legislative bodies, executive or administrative agencies); that they are made
in accordance with general community expectation about how they
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should be made-in a genuine effort to clarify common interest; that
they are made by established procedures rather than by convenience or
chance; and that the people who make these decisions have enough
effective power to put their choices into practice in a consequential
number of controlling instances. The whole process of decision, if it is
authoritative in the sense we specify, is one of clarifying and implementing common interest, and I would emphasize that the real sanction in
the long run of any law is in this perception of common interest. I think
we have a very substantial process of this kind on a global scale-despite
all the difficulties about aggression and self-defense and the maintenance of the most basic goal of all, security.
If one looks more closely at this global process of authoritative decision, I think one can see that it, also, is made up of two different kinds
of decisions. First, there are the decisions that establish and maintain,
or constitute, the whole process. These are the decisions which identify
and characterize the different established decision-makers; specify and
clarify the broad outlines of basic community policies, with indication
of different intensities in degree of demand; establish structure of authority for appropriate performance of different governmental functions;
allocate bases of power (in authority and control) among different
decision-makers for sanctioning purposes; authorize the procedures for
gathering facts or exploring policies necessary to the different kinds of
decisions; and secure the continuous performance of all the functions
(intelligence, promotion, invocation, etc.) indispensable to the making
and application of law. It will be noted that this conception of "constitutive process" is much more ample than the traditional notions of constitutional law as judicial decision within which much Anglo-American
thinking is confined.
The second type of decision refers to those establishing the public
order emerging from this constitutive process, the decisions which shape
and secure the protected features of the community's different value
processes; the degree to which security is maintained, the clarity with
which conceptions of aggression and defense are achieved and enforced;
the modalities by which resources are allocated and protected, the degree
to which wealth is produced and shared; how human rights are identified
and protected; how enlightenment and health are fostered and protected;
and so on through the whole range of relevant values.
For relevant and economic inquiry about international law, if international law is appropriately conceived as a process of authoritative deci-
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sion, we need, thus, a comprehensive map of the potential interrelations
of community process and legal process. The legal process is a response
to claims people make about features of this larger community process.
It is changes in the distribution of values within community process with
which authoritative decision is concerned. Such decision is affected by
many features in past community process as well as by peoples' anticipations of alternative future distributions of values. The decisions taken,
in turn, not only directly effect an immediate distribution of values
among claimants, but also in aggregate determine the quality of the
community's public order. The more comprehensive and realistic an
observer's map of the potential interrelations of community process and
legal process, the more fruitful his inquiry is likely to be.
The second emphasis suggested was that we be selective in our focus.
We, as lawyers, are experts upon authority. Unfortunately, we too often
leave the study of control to the political scientists and other social
scientists. The most fruitful conception of law, I think, is that of authority conjoined with control. If a prescription reflects authority only, it is
just illusion; if it expresses control only, it is naked power and violence.
The selective focus we recommend is upon the decisions that are both
authoritative and controlling. This focus extends not simply to single
isolated decisions, but to the whole flow of authoritative and controlling
decisions, including both constitutive and public order decisions as described above. It is this emphasis upon authoritative decision which
establishes a center and criteria of relevance for inquiry and facilitates
an orderly and economic exploration of the larger community processes
for precipitating events, conditioning factors, and value impacts.
The historic, selective focus upon technical rules would in contrast
appear to be much too limited. These technical rules are merely some
of the variables that affect decision; they are not the only variables. They
express someone's policy, but often darkly and obscurely. Their attractiveness to the profession has been that they leave it ambiguous both
whose policy and what policy they express. An explicit policy-oriented
approach must have intellectual procedures for clarifying both who is
responsible for policy and what its detailed content is.
This bring me to the third emphasis: what we are trying to do, the
intellectual tasks we seek to perform. It is sometimes said that a profession is a group which both possesses a special skill and an enlightened
view of the goals and aggregate consequences attending the exercise of
its skill. From this perspective, lawyers are specialists upon authority
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(and, hopefully, upon control as well) who assume an explicit responsibility for the establishment, maintenance, and management of processes
of authoritative decision which can clarify and implement basic community policies. Though the lawyer must serve clients, private and public, one way he serves these clients is by clarifying their goals and relating
these to common interests; one mark of the professional man is that he
is not a mere artisan, at the beck and call of every Tom, Dick, and Harry
with a special interest to grind. A fortiori, the scholar who observes and
evaluates processes of authoritative decision must concern himself with
clarification of the common interests which constitute community policy.
Neither the practicing lawyer nor the scholar can be content with mere
description of the past: Both must be concerned with what people demand and with means for affecting the future to secure such demands.
The first task we recommend is, hence, that of the deliberate and
explicit clarification of goal values. For the scholar, this means the
values for which he is willing to take personal responsibility in recommending to the different communities of which he is a member. To the
degree that economy permits, every particular choice recommended
should be related to all the interests it affects and its larger community
contexts.
The second task recommended is that of description of past trends in
decision, in terms of their approximation to basic community policies.
The relevance of inquiry where we have been is to find out where we are
and what we can learn about how we got there. The most effective
comparison of trends through time and across boundaries requires that
the events which precipitate recourse to authoritative decision, the detailed claims which are made to such decision, the factors which appear
to condition decision, and the immediate and longer term consequences
of decisions all be categorized in terms of facts rather than of technical
legal doctrines.
The third task is that of identifying the factors affecting decision,
which requires careful and systematic exploration of many variables,
both predispositional and environmental.
The fourth task is that of projecting future trends in decision. This
requires, in lieu of the simple linear or chronological extrapolations of
conventional legal theory, the formulation and testing by many different
methods of alternative developmental constructs, embodying varying
anticipations of the future.
The fifth and final task is that of the invention and evaluation of
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alternatives. If what we observe or predict is not in accord with our basic
clarified policies, what can we do about it? This task requires examination of every phase of decision process and its context for opportunities
in innovation-new policies, new institutions-which may influence decision toward greater conformity to clarified goals.
The next major emphasis in policy-oriented inquiry about international law requires the explicit postulation of a comprehensive set of goal
values. It should be obvious that one cannot economically perform any
of the intellectual tasks indicated above unless he is quite clear about the
values with which he works. We recommend postulation, rather than
derivation, since experience has shown that people enjoying many different styles in derivation can cooperate for the same human dignity values.
We work with a set of eight value terms, systematically defined by
reference to a series of institutional practices; but one could work with
two, twenty, or forty major terms if these terms are given a clear reference to detailed relationships between human beings. The important
point is to make comprehensive, combined value-institutional reference
to events which escapes the exclusive, parochial perspectives of any particular segment of the larger community of mankind. When basic goal
values are kept clear, many different institutional practices, from different communities and cultures, may be seen to contribute equally to the
shaping and sharing of such values.
Part of the preparation I did for this meeting was to read a little book,
edited by Mr. J.A. Jolowicz of Cambridge University, on The Division
and Classification of the Law. (The late Professor Jolowicz of Oxford
was my teacher, and I have a great deference for anyone who bears that
name.) This is an interesting book, on a most important problem. Mr.
Jolowicz issues an eloquent call for the reclassification of law, for purposes of inquiry, in terms of facts rather than of technical concepts. By
this he hopes to achieve a classification of "problems which should be
considered together because, in the social context, they are essentially
similar types of problems"--that is, a classification in terms of problems which raise comparable policy problems and facilitate the comparisons through time and across boundaries indispensable to effective inquiry. Unhappily, however, Mr. Jolowicz handicapped himself by a
conception of law in terms of "rules" rather than in terms of decision
process responding to events in social process, and he had no chance to
escape from the blinders imposed by the rules to a comprehensive categorization, from the standpoint of an observer, of the facts to which
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decision-makers respond. The main headings of his suggested reclassification are both conventional and limited, containing no reference to
global power process or international law.
In fact, none of the discussants in Mr. Jolowicz' book seemed to have
much notion of the relevance of the larger community process to their
inquiry or of how to organize in terms of fact. Professor Twining of
Belfast, a gifted and sophisticated scholar who has had opportunity to
learn better, (along with certain associates) takes Mr. Jolowicz to task
for his calls for facts. What are "facts?" Professor Twining asks. He
doesn't know what "facts" are; they can be described at many different
levels of abstraction, and Mr. Jolowicz' descriptions are mixed up with
the references of legal rules. In the course of his exposition Professor
Twining makes reference to Professor Lasswell and myself and notes an
odd suggestion from across the waters that a law school curriculum
might be organized about "values." While conceding that inquiry might
be organized about "values" or "human rights," Professor Twining is
as uncertain about "values" as he is about "facts" and wonders what
purpose might be served by such a reclassification or any new classification.
There is of course no insuperable intellectual difficulty in scholars'
specifying the references they make in terms of "values" or "facts" and
in proffering a set of categories for describing social process and legal
process, while both distinguishing such processes and noting their interrelations. By such "value" terms as "power," "wealth," "respect,"
"enlightenment," and so on, and such "institutional" terms as "participation," "perspectives," "situations," "strategies," and so on, one can
make comprehensive, explicit, and detailed reference both to the empirical relations between human beings to which legal process is a response,
and in turn affects, and to the various relevant features of such legal
process itself. These value and institutional terms may be economically
employed to facilitate performance of all the intellectual tasks incumbent upon either the scholar or decision-maker: to state the preferences
about decision of the observer or others; to describe the degree in which
past decisions approximate stipulated preferences; to categorize the predispositional and environmental factors affecting decision; to project
probable developments in future decision; and to evaluate possible new
alternatives in legal and social process. It is only by some such categories
that scholars and others can escape the complementarities, ambiguities,
and incomplete references of conventional, technical rules.
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In passing, let me say that it was heartening to hear Professor Simmond's reference to law as communication. Certainly, what is called the
making of law-the creation in community members of expectations
about the content of policy, and about its authority and control-as well
as most other phases of legal process, involves communication. What I
would emphasize is that more than communication (the shaping and
reshaping of rules) is involved. Legal process includes not merely communications, but also operations, acts of collaboration-active choices
or decisions and their implementation in controlling practice to effect a
distribution of values. The notion of a process of communication may,
however, be effectively employed to facilitate understanding of many
problems, such as in the interpretation or application of prescriptions.
When we turn to our fifth and final, major emphasis-that upon the
systematic, continuous inquiry-we recommend aspiration toward a
comprehensive, conceptual map of the interrelations of world community process and processes of authoritative decision which both facilitates
contextual inquiry about particular problems and spotlights the more
important problems. So comprehensive a map can of course be made
manageable only by the establishing of priorities in importance, determined in accordance with postulated overriding goal values.
The map we recommend begins with inquiry about constitutive process. What are the decisions that establish this process, that determine
how international law is made and applied? Who participates in the
making of these decisions? Nation-state officials, international governmental organizations, political parties, pressure groups, private associations, individual human beings? What characteristics of these participants predominantly affect their decisions? From what perspectives do
the effective elites who maintain this process move? What are their
demands for values, their identifications with different territorial communities and functional groups, and their expectations about the conditions under which they can achieve their demands? In what degree are
they able to perceive, and act upon perceptions of common interest?
What structures of authority-diplomatic, diplomatic-parliamentary,
parliamentary, adjudicative, and executive-are established in what geographic and temporal distribution for the making of decisions? How
open and compulsory is access by participants to such structures? How
is authority distributed among participants with respect to different
types of decisions, and what bases of effective control are allocated to
different participants? What employment by whom is authorized of the
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diplomatic, ideological, economic, and military instruments of policy,
and what detailed procedures are established for particular exercises of
these instruments? In what different types of decisions does the whole
process culminate? How is the intelligence necessary to rational decision
gathered, processed, and disseminated? Who takes the initiative in the
active advocacy of policy alternatives, propagating demands and mobilizing resources? By what sequences in the exploration of potential facts
and policies, in the detailed clarification of particular policies, and in the
communication of expectation about authority and control is general
community policy made authoritative and controlling? Who invokes,
how, in what structures of authority the application of authoritative
policies in particular instances? By what detailed processes do the exploration and characterization of facts and policies, the projection of decision, and enforcement measures go forward? How are prescriptions, and
arrangements made under them, terminated when they no longer serve
common interest? How does the general community maintain a continuing appraisal of the adequacy of past decisions to secure postulated
goals? And so on. Two colleagues, Professors Lasswell and Reisman,
and I have under way what will amount to a two-volume study in answer
to these and other relevant questions.
With the basic features of global constitutive process outlined, the
map we recommend proceeds to inquire about the "public order" decisions-the decisions about the shaping and sharing of particular values-which emerge from this constitutive process. The most economic
and relevant mode of inquiry would of course be to proceed value by
value. Thus, in relation to wealth, how and in what degree is a global
economy established and maintained: How are resources allocated,
planned, and developed and how are the production, conservation, distribution, and enjoyment of goods and services managed? With respect
to enlightenment, what are the decisions about the gathering, dissemination, and enjoyment of knowledge: How are individuals and groups
protected in their claims for the basic enlightenment necessary to the
achievement of their potentialities, for additional enlightenment on the
basis of merit, and in freedom from discrimination for reasons irrelevant
to merit? And so on, with respect to such other representative values as
well-being, respect, skill, rectitude, and affection. It is obvious that inquiry of this kind would make irrelevant many of the traditional distinctions between public international law, private international law, and
comparative constitutional law. Unfortunately, there has been too little
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scholarly inquiry from these perspectives to permit the detailed completion of such a map.
The more traditional approach to public order decisions has been in
terms of the protection that different participants in world social process
secure from constitutive process. Thus, most of the conventional casebooks in public international law published about the world deal almost
exclusively with the protection accorded the nation-state. After a few
pages devoted to the "nature" and "sources" of international law, most
of these books move immediately into certain limited inquiries: How is
a territorial community "recognized" as a state? What resources can it
acquire, and how does it establish control? Whom can it regard as its
"nationals?" What are the principles for allocating "jurisdiction" over
events between states? How are agreements and coercive relations regulated?
These limited inquiries are important, but are far from exhausting
importait inquiry even in comparable vein. Exactly the same questions
could be asked about international governmental organizations and
transnational private associations. How does the entity get established
with a distinct legal personality? What are its permissible objectives and
structures of authority? How does it acquire and control bases? What
are its authorized procedures? How does it formulate and apply its own
policies? How are its interactions with other participants, of all different
types, regulated? Comparable, and no less important, questions could be
asked about the protection of other groups and of the individual human
being.
Still another way of organizing inquiry about public order decisions
is in terms of the protected enjoyment of resources. This is the way in
which colleagues and I have made studies of the "public order" of the
oceans, outer space, air space, and international rivers. With respect to
any major resource or domain, one may ask how access is obtained, how
particular resources are allocated for inclusive or exclusive enjoyment,
how law is made and applied for particular interactions in enjoyment,
how minimum order is maintained, and how potentially conflicting enjoyments are accommodated.
The important point I would make, in conclusion, is that there are
many ways, potentially more fruitful than the conventional focus upon
technical rules and concepts, of organizing inquiry about the world process of authoritative decision and its interrelations with world social
process. Whatever modes different scholars may employ, it is urgent, as
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Professor Falk emphasized this morning, that we acquire as quickly as
possible a better understanding of world constitutive process-of how
international law is in fact made and applied-and that we promptly
bring this new understanding to bear upon all the more threatening
public order problems now confronting us. Upon the most urgent problem of all, that of maintaining minimum order, of controlling unauthorized coercion, we have made hardly a beginning. It may be that, given
our present spoliative practices, the oceans of the world will not shortly
become dead cesspools, but we cannot afford to take the chance. It may
be that a badly wounded world society and economy can accommodate
seven billion inhabitants of the globe by the turn of the century without
tremendous loss in the quality of life for individuals, but the eventuality
of many more people is one for which we should be making the most
comprehensive and rational plans. When confronted by all these problems, and others of comparable magnitude, it would appear frivolous for
scholars to make nice discriminations in priorities of urgency.

